TUKARAM G.GAOKAR V. R. N. SHUKLA AND ORS INSC 62; AIR 1968 SC 1050; 1968 SCR 422

CASE NAME: Tukaram G. Gaokar vs. R.N. Shukla and Others, Supreme Court of India, March 8, 1968

FACTS: On September 14 and 17, 1966, customs officials executed raids in Bombay and seized a substantial quantity of foreign gold (65,860 tolas) and gold bangles priced at ₹1.14 crore. The appellant, Tukaram G. Gaokar, was arrested on allegations of gold smuggling. Subsequently, a First Information Report (FIR) was filed, charging him and others with smuggling offenses under several statutes, including: - Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (criminal conspiracy) - Section 135 of the Sea Customs Act - Rule 131-B of the Defence of India Rules - Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act As a criminal trial for smuggling was forthcoming, the Assistant Collector of Customs issued a notice under Sections 111 and 112 of the Sea Customs Act, requiring the appellant to justify why the gold should not be confiscated and why a penalty should not be levied for his alleged smuggling activities. The appellant contended that these proceedings constituted contempt of court, given that the trial on related charges was ongoing, and also infringed upon his constitutional rights under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution, which safeguards against self-incrimination

ISSUES: 1. Do the proceedings under Sections 111 and 112 of the Sea Customs Act constitute contempt of court while a criminal trial for related offenses is in progress? 2. Do these proceedings violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination?

HOLDING: The Supreme Court held that the proceedings under Sections 111 and 112 of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute contempt of court. Furthermore, the Court determined that these proceedings do not violate Article 20(3), as the appellant is not compelled to testify against himself in this context. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, with no costs awarded.

RATIONALE: The Supreme Court determined that the actions taken under Sections 111 and 112 of the Sea Customs Act were valid and separate from the criminal trial currently ongoing against the appellant. The customs officials, operating under their legal power, had the authority to decide on issues of confiscation and penalties, something the criminal court was unable to do. Parallel proceedings of this kind are expressly permitted by the Act, as indicated in Section 127, which allows for penalties under Section 112 and punishments under Section 135 to exist simultaneously. The Court determined that there was no proof that the customs proceedings hindered or disrupted the administration of justice, and therefore, there was no contempt of court. Concerning the appellant's argument under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the Court explained that the safeguard against self-incrimination is relevant solely when there is pressure from an outside authority to testify against himself/herself. In this scenario, the appellant was not required to provide testimony in the customs proceedings, and his decision to do so would be made voluntarily, rather than under duress. The Court also did not address whether Article 20(3) might apply if the appellant was forced to provide testimony under Section 108 of the Act. Finally, the appellant's claim concerning a breach of Article 14 (equality before the law) was dropped during the appeal, resulting in no grounds for contest.

CITATION: <ref>MANU/SC/0110/1961<ref>