KURBAN HUSSEIN MOHAMMEDALI RANGWALLA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA INSC 295; AIR 1965 SC 1616; 1965 SCR 622

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KURBAN HUSSEIN MOHAMMEDALI RANGWALLA V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA INSC 295; AIR 1965 SC 1616; 1965 SCR 622

This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered by Justice Wanchoo. The principal questions arising in this case relate to the proper construction of Sections 304A and 285 of the IPC.

Facts The appellant was the owner of a factory known as Carbon Dry Colour Works, manufacturing paints and varnish. The factory was licensed by the Bombay Municipality in 1953 to manufacture paints by a cold process. It was also licensed to store certain quantities of turpentine, varnish and paint. The appellant, who is the manager as well as the working partner, changed over the manufacturing process of the factory from cold to a heating process for the production of wet paints. This new method consisted of melting rosin or bitumen in barrels, which were fitted with burners over them, then adding turpentine to the mixture after it has cooled down a little.

Details of the Incident On April 20, 1962, wet paint manufacture was going ahead in the works, upon which no license had been issued. One of the employees, Hatim Tasduq, as manager of the operation. At about 5 PM, just before closing time, he began to pour turpentine into the barrel of melted rosin. Since the mixture was insufficiently cooled, it frothed up, overflowing from the barrel. This resulted in a fire, as the turpentine and varnish in open cans nearby were ignited. Seven workers who were working on a loft had no means of exit and were thus burned to death. Others who were on the ground floor managed to escape with burns.

Judicial Process The appellant and three others were originally prosecuted. The Magistrate acquitted the appellants' partners but convicted the appellant under Sections 304-A causing death by negligence and 285 of negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter of the IPC. The High Court summarily dismissed the appellant's appeal and special leave to appeal was prayed for against that judgment.

Section 304-A IPC Section 304-A IPC relates to causing death by a rash or negligent act. The appellant contended that at no time was he present when the fire broke out and it was not possible to make him liable for the death. The Magistrate held him liable as he permitted the manufacturing of wet paints in the same room in which inflammable substances were stored.

It has, however, been held by the Supreme Court time and again that for a conviction under Section 304-A death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act. The immediate cause of the fire was the negligence of Hatim in handling the turpentine. The Court relied upon Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap and held that to invoke criminal liability under Section 304-A, the negligent act must have been the direct cause of death, and the chain is not broken even by the intervention of another's negligence. But in this case, the appellant allowing burners in the room was an indirect cause of death, although not a direct one. Thus, the appellant was acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 304-A.

Section 285 IPC Section 285 IPC deals with negligent conduct in respect of fire or combustible matter. It was established that the appellant had willfully or negligently omitted to take necessary precautions with fire and combustible materials in his possession, whereby human life was endangered. Following were the glaring violations pointed out by the Court:

The appellant was not holding any licence for the manufacture of wet paints. Conditions of the storage licence were breached including the general and special conditions for the prohibition against lighting fires in the room when combustible materials were stored therein . The proximity of naked flames to highly flammable substances like turpentine and varnish posed a probable danger to human life. The Court of Appeal discharged the appellant based on an argument that his acts threatened only a possible, not probable, danger to human life. Taking into account the high inflammability of the materials and their proximity to the burners, the court concluded that there was a probable danger to human life. This was compounded by the breach of the licensing conditions.

Conclusion The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the conviction under Section 304A but upheld that under Section 285. awarding of six months' rigorous imprisonment under Section 285, in view of the loss of seven lives due to the appellant's negligence was found proper.

Key Points Section 304-A IPC: The death must be a direct and proximate result of the negligent act. In the present case, the negligence of the appellant was indirect. Section 285 IPC: This section deals with negligent handling of fire or combustible matter so as to endanger human life. The acts of the appellant were held to cause probable danger having regard to violations of conditions of the license and the per se dangerous setup. Result: Acquittal under Section 304-A; conviction and maximum sentence upheld under Section 285. This case impresses the necessity of strict adherence to the safety measures and licensing conditions involving hazardous substances. It has also clarified the legal meaning of the term 'negligence' under the IPC. Equivalent citations: A.I.R 1989 SC 1230. Differentiation between 'direct' and `indirect 'causation for criminal liability.