RAJESHWAR SINGH v. SUBRATA ROY SAHARA AND ORS. INSC 1085

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23. Article 142 of the Constitution also confers powers on this Court to pass such orders as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The said Article 142 reads as under: “Article 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc. The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.” 24. Article 142 is conceived to meet situations which cannot be effectively and appropriately tackled by existing provisions of law. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. Ltd. and another 4 SCC 622, this Court has held that the very fact that the power is conferred only upon the Supreme Court, and on no one else, is itself an assurance that it will be used with due restraint and circumspection; keeping in view the ultimate object of doing complete justice between parties and the Court’s power to do complete justice is not confined by any statutory provision.

25. We may indicate that the petitioner has inter alia invoked the jurisdiction and power conferred on this Court under the above-mentioned constitutional provisions and hence the consent of the Attorney General is not necessary. Petitioner is only expected to bring to notice of this Court the problems he confronts with while carrying on a court monitored investigation and it is the duty and obligation of this Court to see, rather than the petitioner, that nobody puts any pressure or threat on an Officer entrusted with the duty to investigate a court monitored criminal investigation. Any interference, by anybody, to scuttle a court monitored investigation would amount to interfering with the administration of justice. Courts, if they are to serve the cause of justice, must have the power to secure obedience to its orders to prevent interference with the proceedings and to protect the reputation of the legal system, its components and its personnel, who on its behest carry on a court monitored investigation. The court is duty bound to protect the dignity and authority of this Court, at any cost, or else, the entire administration of justice will crumble and law and order would be a casualty.

26. We are, therefore, of the view that the petition filed under the above mentioned provisions is perfectly maintainable and this Court has got a constitutional obligation to examine the truth of the allegations as to whether the respondents are attempting to derail the investigation which is being monitored by this Court. We, therefore, issue notice to the respondents to show cause why proceedings be not initiated against them for interfering with the court monitored criminal investigation.