GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. V. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AND ORS INSC 230; AIR 1981 SC 606; 1981 SCR 341

Introduction

The case Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors deals with the question of whether an Industrial Tribunal has the authority to set aside an ex parte award. This case, under the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction (Civil Appeal No. 2355 of 1979), stems from a judgment by the Calcutta High Court which refrained from interfering with an order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta. The Tribunal had set aside an ex parte award made by it, which the appellant, Grindlays Bank Ltd., challenged.

Factual Background

The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, referred an industrial dispute between Grindlays Bank Ltd. and its workmen to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Tribunal initially set a hearing date for May 28, 1976, which was subsequently adjourned multiple times. Eventually, the hearing was scheduled for December 9, 1976. On this date, counsel for the respondents (Commercial Establishments Employees Association) sought an adjournment due to the General Secretary's bereavement. Despite providing a telegram as proof, the Tribunal denied the adjournment request and proceeded ex parte, ruling in favor of the appellant based on evidence presented by the bank's manager.

On January 19, 1977, the respondents filed an application to set aside the ex parte award, arguing they had been prevented from appearing due to sufficient cause. The Tribunal, satisfied with their reasoning, set aside the ex parte award on April 12, 1977, prompting the appellant to challenge this decision.

Legal Issues

The appeal raised two primary questions:

Whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, particularly one based on evidence. Whether the Tribunal became functus officio (lost jurisdiction) after 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award, under section 17 and sub-section (3) of section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, thereby rendering only the Central Government competent to set it aside under section 17-A. Arguments by the Appellant

The appellant contended that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the rules framed thereunder, did not confer any power on the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award. They argued that the ex parte award, based on evidence, amounted to an adjudication on merits and the respondents' application was effectively a request for review rather than merely setting aside the award. The appellant distinguished between an application for review and one for setting aside an ex parte award based on evidence, asserting that a review on merits was not permissible unless specifically provided for by statute.

Court's Analysis

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the objectives of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which aims to ensure social justice for both employers and employees, and to foster industrial harmony. The Court recognized that the Act's purpose was to resolve disputes amicably through conciliation, arbitration, and, if necessary, Tribunal adjudication.

Powers of the Tribunal

The Court pointed out that section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act allows the Tribunal to follow such procedures as it deems fit, subject to the rules made in this behalf. This provision endows the Tribunal with wide procedural discretion. Furthermore, section 11(3) grants the Tribunal powers similar to those of a civil court, including enforcing attendance, compelling document production, and issuing commissions.

The Court held that these provisions imply the Tribunal has incidental and ancillary powers necessary to effectively discharge its functions. Therefore, the Tribunal could set aside an ex parte award if it deemed it necessary in the interest of justice.

Rule 22 and Rule 24(b)

Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, allows the Tribunal to proceed ex parte if a party fails to attend without sufficient cause. The Court interpreted this rule to mean that the Tribunal could inquire into whether sufficient cause existed for a party's absence. If such cause was established, the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award.

Rule 24(b) confers upon the Tribunal the power of a civil court concerning adjournments under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This power includes the discretion to grant or refuse adjournments and, consequently, to set aside an ex parte award if procedural justice demands it.

Distinction Between Review and Setting Aside

The Court addressed the appellant's contention that setting aside the ex parte award was equivalent to a review. The Court clarified that a procedural review, intended to correct inadvertent errors or procedural defects, is inherent in any judicial or quasi-judicial body. The Tribunal's action in setting aside the ex parte award fell within this category, as it aimed to rectify an error caused by the respondents' justified absence.

Functus Officio Argument

The appellant argued that the Tribunal became functus officio after 30 days from the publication of the ex parte award. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over a dispute until the award becomes enforceable under section 17A. In this case, the respondents filed their application to set aside the ex parte award within the 30-day period, giving the Tribunal the authority to entertain and decide the application.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to set aside the ex parte award, affirming that the Tribunal possessed the necessary jurisdiction and ancillary powers to do so. The Court dismissed the appeal, ruling in favor of the respondents and awarding costs against the appellant.

Significance

This judgment underscores the Tribunal's broad procedural discretion and its inherent powers to ensure justice, reinforcing the principle that technicalities should not obstruct the resolution of industrial disputes. The decision highlights the Court's commitment to fair adjudication and the protection of parties' rights within the framework of industrial law.